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  Julie C. Van Camp
Abstract
I explore some explanations for why the raging debate over colorization
disappeared almost entirely from both the scholarly dialogue and the
popular press about ten years ago. I also suggest how some of the
insights from the colorization debate long ago inform issues of greater
concern today. I propose that the pragmatic approach I suggested ten
years ago is promising for understanding the issues presented by new
technologies today and in the future.
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Ten years ago it was difficult to pick up a newspaper or an aesthetics
journal or to attend a professional meeting in philosophy or aesthetics
without encountering the raging debate over the colorization of films.[1]
But in about 1995 that debate disappeared almost entirely from the radar
screen. My goal here is to explore what has happened in the past decade
that moved this debate off the front burner -- if not off the stove entirely.
I also will propose how some of the insights from the colorization debate
long ago inform issues of greater concern today.
1. Recent attention to colorization
Colorization has not entirely disappeared from the literature, but it is no
longer a central focus of anyone's attention.[2] It is sometimes mentioned
in passing as an illustration or analogy to some other issue.[3] Although
there is an occasional commercial flare-up on the issue,[4] it also is
recognized as an uncontroversial artistic technique when practiced by the
artist on his or her own work.[5] Even though it remains a popular
discussion topic in classrooms, it is not included in most aesthetics
textbooks.[6] The search engine Google.com turns up a few recent essays
on colorization, but they seem mainly to be student term papers that
rehash the old debates,[7] on-line encyclopedia articles,[8] or essays by
non-philosophers[9] which do not move us beyond the debate of circa
1995.
The nation's courts do not seem very interested in the policy or
philosophical issues of colorization either. The U.S. Supreme Court has
never used the word 'colorization.'[10] In the Federal appellate courts,
only one case has considered colorization -- not for its desirability, but in a
bankruptcy case in which the failure to complete a contract to colorize
work for a movie studio was one of the financial issues.[11] The Federal
district courts talked about colorization in six cases in the past thirteen
years, but these were mainly fights about patents for elements of the
colorization process, not anything substantive or philosophical about the
merits of colorization or the rights of artists.[12] The rights of the patent
holders on the colorization process were of more interest to these courts.
One group seems to have remained somewhat interested in colorization,
viz., law students editing law reviews. Over the past decade, at least fifty-
six articles have been published and can be found with a simple Lexis
search. But they do not focus on colorization as their main concern and
are not addressing the themes that so engaged philosophers a decade
ago.
Some articles in the law journals have looked at international intellectual
property law, of which colorization (treated differently in continental
Europe from the United States) is one minor issue.[13] Some in the law
seem interested in the role of "moral rights of artists" in the United States,
an issue we have only recently come to terms with as we enter
international copyright treaties. Legal scholars are interested in the
technical issues of merging conflicting cultures and attitudes toward
intellectual property and the rights of artists. As philosophers, the
challenging issues are the cultural differences that lead to such different
approaches to artists. In the United States and Great Britain, for example,
we have approached intellectual property rights as mainly economic
property rights. Continental Europe, especially the French, have long
understood a moral right of an artist to the integrity of the work, even
after the transfer of economic rights. That issue, of course, is at the heart
of the colorization issue. Although we have had some limited attention to
these philosophical underpinnings of our understanding of artistic creation,
we have much to probe and try to understand.
2. Declining interest in colorization
Why has colorization itself, as an issue, apparently disappeared from our
collective intellectual consciousness? Why do any once-urgent issues of
public and scholarly dialogue disappear from our radar screens? Perhaps
we reach a resolution that almost all people find agreeable. We no longer
debate equal-pay-for-equal-work as the culture did in the early seventies.
We seem to have reached a public understanding that this is the right
thing to do and we have moved on to other issues, such as equal-pay-for-
comparable-work, for example.
Perhaps we feel all the perspectives are on the table and we will never
fully resolve the issue, but we have reached an equilibrium in our daily
lives so that we do not really need to continue the discussion. I do not
believe we ever reached a consensus on colorization, but perhaps we
reached an equilibrium and felt that all the issues were on the table and
there was nothing more to say.
Perhaps we lost interest in colorizing simply because Ted Turner stopped
colorizing films and provoking controversy. He, in turn, seems to have
stopped colorizing for simple economic reasons.[14] If crass
commercialization was to blame for colorization in the first place, as some
thought, then ordinary market forces perhaps led to its demise in recent
issues.
But I believe there is more to it. 1995, the last year in which the scholarly
dialogue showed an interest in colorization, was a turning point in ways we
could not have imagined at the time. This was the last year in history
when almost everybody was blissfully ignorant of the World Wide Web.
Some academics and scientists were using a crude, user-unfriendly form
of e-mail, and a few even knew something about the Web. Some members
of the public were subscribing to America On-Line (AOL), then a pre-Web
technology with on-line resources.
3. A technological turning point
But by late 1995, the "killer ape" of the Web exploded in our national
consciousness. Suddenly, we all needed new Pentium computers with the
power and software that could access the Web. We tried free offers from
Internet companies and were forever transformed. Suddenly, otherwise
normal adults found themselves "surfing" the Web for hours, days, even
months at a time, amazed at the amount of material available. In those
"salad days" of the Internet, we turned our attention to teaching our
students on-line or digitizing vast libraries of material so we could access
them on-line and skip the hard work of searching "real" books and
journals in non-virtual buildings called libraries. We reveled in our self-
publishing to the world by creating and posting our own individual web
pages, even if nobody but family members ever looked at them.
We are no longer amazed at astonishing research feats that would have
been inconceivable only a decade ago, such as searching the huge
database of court decisions looking for the occurrence of a single word,
"colorization," as I did for this project. In a matter of a few years, we have
become downright complacent about the capabilities of computers and
related technologies to change our lives and our work. In this
environment, we are no longer shocked or dazzled or startled by the
capabilities of technology. Colorization seems a downright trivial, almost
ancient technology with issues somewhat clear and unambiguous, even if
we do not all agree on the desired outcome.
Our frenzied attention to a different sort of technology, with a new
vocabulary of its own -- of bits and bytes and virtual realities and
cyberspace -- made the technology of colorization seem positively quaint
and uninteresting. Our ethical interest in technology has been diverted to
a vastly more complex and interesting set of challenges. We wonder how
new technology changes our understanding of the identity of a work and
the moral rights of artists. We face a host of new challenges in
understanding how copyright law is being dramatically reshaped by the
piracy now made so easy from Web pages. We are overwhelmed with the
issues of digitizing films, special effects, and various realities -- virtual,
pseudo- and otherwise.
4. Evaluating new forms of modification of artworks
Philosophical dialogue on these issues is taking shape and will likely
preoccupy us for years.[15] I propose that the approach I developed for
the colorization debate a decade ago will serve us well in addressing
technology issues. I was not interested in either defending or criticizing
colorization per se, nor am I now interested in defending or criticizing
specific technological practices. Rather, I was interested then and now in
the quality of the various arguments presented in the debate, and I urged
that we look to other art forms for precedent on how to address
modifications made in existing artworks, whether through new
technologies or otherwise. "Art made from art" or "derivative works" based
on other works can be found in all artforms and provide us with principles
helpful in sorting out the colorization and now the technological issues.
I identified three types of arguments in the literature, none of which
provided a decisive solution on colorization. First, I looked at the rights of
artists.[16] These include their right to freedom of expression, both in
creating a work of art and in altering existing works. I also considered
whatever moral rights artists have, as they do in Europe, to prevent the
alteration of their work even after they have relinquished their economic
rights.
Next I looked at arguments that center on the rights of works
themselves,[17] a peculiar notion in the literature. To this day, we have
not extended rights to inanimate objects and we must strain with difficulty
to find such rights.
Third, I considered the rights of audiences -- whether rights to quality art
or art as intended by the artists or as intended by another person who
altered the work.[18] But these supposed rights do not resolve anything in
the colorization argument either.
I then articulated principles to use in assessing the value and legitimacy of
any kind of alteration in any artwork -- whether colorization of films or
something else. I took what I consider a pragmatist approach, looking to
the continuing dialogue within art world communities.
First, I suggested we look to conventions for the acceptability of
modifications within an art form[19] -- conventions which reflect that art
community's shared views about the practices which best promote the
potential of that art form. The first principle goes to the evaluation of that
art form. What are the conventions for modification within an art form?
Think of the continuing debate over lighting in our perception of visual
arts, of our standards for architectural preservation of historic buildings,
and of our evolving standards for the use of wires and toe shoes in dance.
Second, I said we should look to the assessment of the artist producing
that work.[20] This considers the ongoing dialogue within an art
community, and we should not be surprised if it continually shifts.
Standards evolve for what evidence to count as contributing to our
valuation of our artist's skills. Some modifications unfairly hurt the
reputation of an artist -- as filmmakers sometimes claimed in the
colorization controversy. But some actually seem to help -- as with the
now-standard use of pointe shoes in reconstructions of the dances of
Danish choreographer Auguste Bournonville.
5. Principles for assessing modifications in art
I then proposed four principles[21] which help us better weigh the
appropriateness of modifications to any art form, including colorization:
(1) If the artist is still living to clarify his or her intentions and preferences
for the presentation of the work, we are more likely to feel an obligation to
defer to the artist's wishes. Living artists can clarify their intentions and
preferences for the presentations of their work. The work is then more
accurate evidence of the skill of the artist.
(2) If the artist is no longer living, we are more likely to find modifications
objectionable if the artist knew about (or reasonably could have
anticipated) the alternative technology or method of presentation and thus
could be presumed to have made a conscious decision not to use it. If we
know that the artist made a conscious decision not to use an available
technology, we have an additional piece of information about the artist's
skill.
(3) We are more likely to object to changes made by someone else
without the permission of the artist (for example, the addition of toe shoes
to Bournonville's choreography) than to modifications made by the artist
(for example, the revision of the ending by Balanchine to his Four
Temperaments or the "colorizing" by Wallace Nutting of his own black-
and-white nature photographs). If the artist made the changes in his or
her own work, we presume that the changes were intentionally made; we
thus have additional information about the artist's skill in artistic decision-
making. For example, Balanchine changed the choreography for the
ending of his Four Temperaments when he staged the work for television
and liked it so much that he retained the changes for theater
performances, some thirty years after he originally choreographed the
work. The credits for the television performance say the work was
"choreographed and reconceived for television" by Balanchine.[22]
In contrast, if someone else made the changes, we do not know (based on
that information alone) whether the artist would have made that decision.
Even so, we do not take the artist's decision to modify as beyond debate.
Legitimate aesthetic debates have occurred over the changes by authors
to their own works. (For example, the Pacific Northwest Ballet prefers
Balanchine's original ending to Four Temperaments and still performs that
version.)
(4) We are more likely to object to modifications that are not clearly
identified as such, when the modified work is "passed off" as the "original"
work to a new audience. If the derivative work is clearly identified as such,
we are being told that it does not fully reflect the intentions of the artist
and his or her skill in artistic decision-making, so we place less weight on
the value of the work as a means of assessing the artist's skill. Films on
television show the results of the colorization battles of a decade ago, as
they now routinely include disclaimers that the film has been altered to fit
the television screen, or that it has been shortened to make it suitable for
a general audience.
6. Recent controversies
These principles on colorization help us understand more recent
controversies in the arts. It is worth remembering that the main forms of
distribution for colorized films in the early 1990s were television and
videotapes. DVD technology did not emerge into the mainstream until the
last few years of that decade. Some of the DVD distribution is similar to
that of videotapes, and the accommodations are also similar. For example,
DVDs provide you with a choice of a widescreen version as in a theater or
an altered version to fill out the TV screen. The DVDs likely include a
caption explaining whether the film has been restored or the score digitally
remastered. In other words, film distributors now provide full disclosure
about the alterations, if any, that have been made. This is consistent with
my fourth principle, that we are less likely to object to modifications if
they are labelled as such and there is no attempt to "pass off" the
modification as the original work of the artist. We know the artist did not
intend those changes and thus do not alter our judgment of the skill of the
artist based on those changes.
Casablanca[23] -- about which much of the original colorization
controversy flourished -- cannot today be bought in its colorized version.
You get the original black-and-white in what they call the "standard
version: presented in a format preserving the aspect ratio of its original
theatrical exhibition." But the sound is now Dolby digital, a technology that
was unimagined in 1943 when the film was released ? and nobody seems
to get exercised about that modification, perhaps because it is labeled
(and thus not "passing off" something the artist did not intend), and
because we all know we'll enjoy the sound more today because of that
process. In Casablanca, we also get subtitles available in English or French
an accepted modification in the dialogue of the movie world community.
Comparable alterations seem to be accepted without controversy in the
DVD versions of Woody Allen films.[24] A powerful director, still living of
course, he was a vocal critic of colorization at the time. His DVDs include
foreign language subtitles, and they are shown in the original "theatrical
release format" -- but "enhanced for widescreen TV." Apparently, for
Allen, enhancement for newer TVs is okay, but not alteration of the colors.
Presumably, Allen oversaw the enhancement process, so we can still fairly
use the work as evidence of his artistic skill.
The greater storage capacity of DVDs has made possible the inclusion of
other material that was not distributed on videotapes. Not all of that
material seems relevant here, as it does not involve "the work" itself or an
alteration to it, as colorization did. For example, including the movie
trailer, which is clearly not part of the film, whether on a tape or a DVD,
does not raise the issues that modification by colorization does.
The DVD release of The Godfather DVD Collection[25] includes an
enormous amount of bonus material, though much of it does not involve
an alteration to the actual work itself. We get foreign subtitles, "enhanced"
widescreen format, Dolby Digital and those ubiquitous audio commentary
tracks by Coppola himself, all of which alter the actual work from its
original form. As Coppola is still alive and can decide what we should see
to make judgments about his work as an artist, so these alterations have
not provoked controversy.
After years of quiet in the press, a colorization controversy emerged over
the release by Sony's Columbia TriStar of Three Stooges DVDs with
digitized color, along with the original black-and-white versions of the
films. Sony says that the colorization is far superior to earlier techniques
and the DVD gives viewers the option of watching the original black-and-
white version. Sony also acknowledges the economic interest in
colorizations, saying that adding the colorized version means they can
release more old films than would otherwise have ". . . economically
feasible." Critics, such as director Sam Raimi, claimed that this sort of
change is ". . . an artistic interpretation that's not anybody's right to make
except the director's." But using the test of whether viewers can draw an
appropriate inference about the talent of the artist, the inclusion of the
original black-and-white seems to blunt that objection.[26]
7. What next?
Where do we go next? Technology moves so fast, it is can be difficult for
philosophers to keep up. Matthew Causey, a new media artist, asks how
the ". . . ontology of the performance (liveness) [has been] . . . altered
within the space of technology?"[27] He suggests that we explore
reconceiving theater to include other media, including various
technologies. The broader issues, I would suggest, include reconsidering
the ontological nature of both traditional theater, as well as technnologies,
virtual reality, and cyberspace, rich terrain for philosophers.
Philosopher David E. W. Fenner recently argued that modification of
recordings of certain music with today's sophisticated technological
possibilities is not objectionable, so long as the work exists in multiple
instantiations and improves the aesthetic experience of some listeners.
Interestingly, he argued for his position by citing just such an argument
concerning colorization.[28] This use of the precedent of colorization
appropriately appeals to the several factors we should use in making such
judgments about the appropriateness of other modifications to a work and
avoids claiming some sort of "bright line" test.
The colorization controversy was also mentioned in passing to support an
argument by philosopher Eric Katz that historic art works, especially those
found by humans in natural settings, should never be altered, but should
instead be shown respect. This too suggests that the principles of the
colorization debate deserve broadening to issues of modification of works
in general, not narrowly framed "bright line" tests.[29] Gary Edgerton
similarly suggests that the most important remnant of the colorization
debate is helping us understand how to address future technologies, such
as digital color imaging.[30]
Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the colorization debate in
its heyday is that looking for absolute principles of right and wrong do not
help much in the long term. What I proposed then for colorization and now
for greatly expanded uses of technological innovation is that we look for
broader principles that would help us sort out new issues we cannot even
imagine today. As philosophers, that is what we do best and what we can
contribute most usefully to the dialogue. Given the rapidly evolving
technologies of our daily and artistic lives, a pragmatic approach that
centers on on-going community dialogues continues to hold the most
promise, as I argued ten years ago.
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